PBKDF2-SHA512 stands for Password-Based Key Derivation Function 2 using the SHA-512 hash algorithm. PBKDF2 is a key derivation function recommended by NIST SP 800-132 for securely hashing passwords. It works by applying a pseudorandom function (in this case, SHA-512) to the input password along with a cryptographic salt and repeats the process for a configurable number of iterations. This makes brute-force and dictionary attacks significantly more difficult, as each password guess requires substantial computation.

Since OS X 10.8 (Mountain Lion), MacOS has adopted PBKDF2-SHA512 for storing user password hashes. This approach aligns with industry best practices for password security, as outlined by organizations like OWASP and CIS. The use of a strong, slow hash function with a unique salt for each user ensures that even if hashes are extracted, they are resistant to common attack vectors such as precomputed rainbow tables and parallelized cracking attempts. For a deeper understanding of the underlying hash algorithm, see SHA-512: The Pillar of Cryptographic Security.

Extracting password hashes from any system, including MacOS, must be approached with a strong sense of responsibility and legality. Unauthorized access or extraction of password hashes is illegal under laws such as the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA) in the United States and similar statutes worldwide. Always ensure you have explicit, documented authorization before attempting any password recovery or hash extraction on systems you do not own.

Permissible scenarios for extracting PBKDF2-SHA512 hashes include:

• Recovering lost passwords for systems you own or manage
• Digital forensics investigations with proper legal authority
• Penetration testing and red teaming with written client consent
• Security research in controlled, non-production environments

For more on ethical hacking and responsible disclosure, see SANS Institute: Ethical Hacking and Legal Issues.

MacOS uses two main mechanisms for storing authentication data:

• Keychain: Primarily stores user credentials, certificates, and secure notes. It is not used for storing login password hashes.
• Directory Services: Stores user account information, including password hashes, in system files accessible only by privileged users.

While the Keychain is highly secure and encrypted, password hashes for system logins are stored separately to facilitate authentication during login and other system operations.

On modern MacOS systems, user password hashes are stored in the following locations:

• /var/db/dslocal/nodes/Default/users/: Contains user property list (.plist) files, which store hashed password data in the ShadowHashData field.
• /var/db/shadow/hash/: Used in older versions of MacOS (pre-10.7) for storing password hashes.

For PBKDF2-SHA512 hashes, the focus is on the ShadowHashData field within the user’s .plist file. If you need to convert these .plist files to hashcat-compatible formats, consider using the plist MacOSX file converter to hash.

To extract PBKDF2-SHA512 hashes from MacOS, you must have:

• Root or administrative access to the target system. Standard users cannot access the necessary files.
• Physical or remote access with the ability to run commands as sudo or via single-user mode.

Attempting extraction without proper authorization is both unethical and illegal.

Several tools and utilities can assist in extracting and parsing password hashes:

• Terminal: The built-in MacOS command-line interface.
• Plutil: Utility for reading and converting property list files.
• Python: For parsing and decoding binary plist data.
• Hashcat or John the Ripper: For password recovery and hash cracking (see Hashcat and John the Ripper).
• Plist Editor: For manual inspection of .plist files (optional).

If you want to automate extracting the necessary hash components from Office files or MacOS plists, check out the MS Office Hash Extractor and plist MacOSX file converter to hash.

MacOS stores user account information in Directory Services, specifically in property list files located at /var/db/dslocal/nodes/Default/users/. Each user has a corresponding .plist file named after their username (e.g., alice.plist). The ShadowHashData attribute within these files contains the PBKDF2-SHA512 hash and related parameters.

To locate the relevant files:

sudo ls /var/db/dslocal/nodes/Default/users/

This command lists all user property list files. To view the contents of a specific user’s file:

sudo plutil -p /var/db/dslocal/nodes/Default/users/USERNAME.plist

Replace USERNAME with the target account’s username. Look for the ShadowHashData field, which holds the encoded password hash.

Open the Terminal application, which can be found in Applications > Utilities. You must have administrative privileges to proceed.

List all users on the system:

dscl . list /Users

Identify the username for which you want to extract the PBKDF2-SHA512 hash.

To access the user’s property list file:

sudo cat /var/db/dslocal/nodes/Default/users/USERNAME.plist > ~/Desktop/USERNAME.plist

This copies the file to your desktop for analysis. Alternatively, you can view it directly:

sudo plutil -p /var/db/dslocal/nodes/Default/users/USERNAME.plist

Within the USERNAME.plist, locate the ShadowHashData field. This field contains a base64-encoded binary property list. To extract and decode it:

1. Copy the base64 string from the ShadowHashData field.
2. Save it to a file, e.g., shadowhash.b64.
3. Decode the base64 data:

   base64 -d shadowhash.b64 > shadowhash.bin

4. Convert the binary plist to XML for readability:

   plutil -convert xml1 shadowhash.bin -o shadowhash.xml

5. Open shadowhash.xml in a text editor or use plutil -p shadowhash.xml to parse it.

The PBKDF2-SHA512 hash and its parameters (salt, iterations, hash) are now accessible in a structured format. If you want a streamlined way to extract and convert these hashes for use in password recovery tools, the plist MacOSX file converter to hash is highly recommended.

The extracted PBKDF2-SHA512 hash data typically includes:

• salt: A random value unique to each user, used to prevent precomputed attacks.
• iterations: The number of times the hashing function is applied, increasing computational cost.
• entropy: The actual password hash output.

A typical XML representation might look like:

<dict>
  <key>SALTED-SHA512-PBKDF2</key>
  <dict>
    <key>entropy</key>
    <data>...</data>
    <key>iterations</key>
    <integer>35000</integer>
    <key>salt</key>
    <data>...</data>
  </dict>
</dict>

For password recovery tools like Hashcat or John the Ripper, you must convert the extracted data into their expected format. For example, Hashcat’s format for MacOS PBKDF2-SHA512 is:

$ml$iterations$salt$hash

Where:

• iterations: Number of PBKDF2 iterations (e.g., 35000)
• salt: Base64 or hex-encoded salt
• hash: Base64 or hex-encoded entropy

You may need to use a Python script to convert the XML data into this format. For more details, refer to Hashcat Example Hashes. For a comprehensive overview of how password recovering works and best practices, see How password recovering works at Online Hash Crack.

Password hashes are highly sensitive data. Best practices for secure storage include:

• Store hashes only on encrypted drives or within secure containers.
• Limit access to authorized personnel with a legitimate need.
• Use strong access controls and audit logs to monitor hash access.

For more on secure data handling, see CISA: Data Protection Best Practices.

To prevent accidental leaks:

• Never email or transmit hashes over unsecured channels.
• Shred or securely delete temporary files after use.
• Do not upload hashes to public forums or cloud services.

Unintended disclosure of password hashes can lead to severe security breaches, as highlighted by numerous incidents reported by BleepingComputer and Krebs on Security. For a professional approach to auditing, testing, and recovering passwords, you can use Professional Password Audit, Testing & Recovery services.

Permission denied errors are common when accessing system files. Solutions include:

• Ensure you are running commands with sudo or as root.
• Check that System Integrity Protection (SIP) is not blocking access. You may need to disable SIP in recovery mode for advanced operations, but this is not recommended on production systems.
• Verify that the target user’s .plist file exists and is not locked by another process.

For more on MacOS permissions, see Apple Support: Change File Permissions.

If the ShadowHashData field is missing or corrupted:

• Check for recent system updates or disk errors that may have affected Directory Services.
• Review system logs for relevant error messages (Console.app or log show).
• If possible, restore the .plist file from a backup.

Corrupted hash data may require advanced forensic techniques for recovery. For guidance, see Mandiant: Incident Response Resources.

Extracting PBKDF2-SHA512 hashes from MacOS systems is a technically demanding but essential process for password recovery, digital forensics, and security research. By following the steps outlined above—while strictly adhering to legal and ethical guidelines—you can reliably access and interpret password hash data stored in MacOS. Always prioritize secure handling and responsible disclosure to protect user privacy and system integrity. For further learning, consult the authoritative resources listed below.

• NIST SP 800-132: Recommendation for Password-Based Key Derivation
• OWASP Top Ten Security Risks
• Center for Internet Security (CIS) Benchmarks
• Hashcat: Advanced Password Recovery
• John the Ripper: Password Cracker
• SHA-512: The Pillar of Cryptographic Security
• plist MacOSX file converter to hash
• How password recovering works at Online Hash Crack
• Professional Password Audit, Testing & Recovery
• SANS Institute: Ethical Hacking and Legal Issues
• CISA: Data Protection Best Practices
• Apple Support: Change File Permissions
• BleepingComputer: Security News and Analysis
• Krebs on Security: Cybersecurity News
• Mandiant: Incident Response Resources